After-Birth Abortion? Answering Giubilini, Minerva, and Boonin
Article adapted from episode content.

A little over a decade ago, two academics published a short piece in a major medical-ethics journal and set off a firestorm. Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva argued, in effect, that abortion is only half of the coin. The very same reasons commonly used to justify killing a fetus, they claimed, work just as well to justify killing a newborn. In other words, they were defending infanticide—or, as they preferred to call it, “after-birth abortion.”

The piece sent shockwaves through the philosophical community. Academics who themselves support abortion were horrified. Yet in a strange way, none of it should have been news. Peter Singer and Michael Tooley had been advancing the same basic logic for decades. What made Giubilini and Minerva different was not the novelty of their argument but its reach. Their article caught the eye of the press, and for the first time the general public—not just professional ethicists—heard someone say plainly: if we can kill fetuses, why can’t we kill newborns? Neither, they insisted, is an actual person.

To answer arguments like these, we have to begin further back than the arguments themselves. We have to begin with worldview.

Why Worldview Comes First

A worldview is like a pair of glasses. It is the cluster of foundational beliefs through which a person makes sense of reality. Two people can look at the same newborn and see entirely different things, because they are looking through different lenses. If we want to understand how a thoughtful academic could conclude that a healthy newborn may be killed, we have to understand the lenses being worn.

Consider philosophical naturalism, one of the dominant worldviews of our moment. On this view, the universe came from nothing and was caused by nothing. Everything that exists is the product of undirected chance. Human beings, like everything else, are accidental arrangements of physical matter, and therefore have no intrinsic purposes to fulfill. Knowledge, on this account, is strictly physical: if a thing cannot be measured, tested, and observed, it is not real.

Notice what this does to ethics. If human beings are cosmic accidents with no built-in purposes, then there are no obligations that flow from those purposes, because there are none. Objective right and wrong require an objective standard—a moral lawgiver in whom moral rules are grounded. Naturalism cannot supply that. So morality gets reduced to whatever we happen to contract into, or whatever we have consented to. There is no soul, no immaterial essence, nothing that makes a human being the kind of thing that ought to be treated a certain way. We are simply matter, and when we die, that is the end. No judgment, no accounting, no standard we failed or fulfilled. We cease to exist, like everything else.

Now layer on a second worldview: postmodernism. The postmodern claim is that even if objective truth exists, we could never reach it, because we are trapped behind our own perceptions and cultural biases. Knowledge, on this view, is simply what we talk about; we construct reality through language. And if that is so, then human nature is not something we discover—it is something we build. The Supreme Court captured this perfectly in the 1992 Casey decision, whose famous “mystery passage” declared that every individual has the right to define for themselves the meaning of the universe, of human life, and of our place in it.

The trouble is immediate. If human nature is merely constructed and not real, then the natural rights that spring from human nature—the right to life, the right to liberty, the rights the Declaration of Independence treats as preceding government—are not real either. There is nothing objective there to affirm.

This is why the outrage at Giubilini and Minerva, while understandable, often misses the deeper point. Someone who believes human nature is real and knowable would look at the fetus and the newborn, agree that there is no essential difference between them, and draw the pro-life conclusion: both are valuable by nature, so we ought to protect both. But on a naturalistic or postmodern worldview, where value is either accidental or invented, why not draw the opposite conclusion? Why not say neither has intrinsic worth, and both may be killed?

The Argument for After-Birth Abortion

With the worldview foundation in view, the structure of Giubilini and Minerva’s case becomes clear. Following Singer and Tooley, they argue roughly as follows. Neither the fetus nor the newborn is an actual person; each is only a potential one. Only actual persons have a right to life. To be an actual person, a being must be able to value its own existence. Fetuses and newborns cannot do this, so they remain merely potential persons. And since the interests of actual persons always outweigh those of potential ones, both abortion and infanticide are morally permissible, because neither involves killing an actual person.

Everything hinges on their definition of personhood. Being a member of the human species is not enough; possessing human DNA does not, on their view, secure a right to life. Instead, a person must be capable of three things, and capable of exercising them immediately: valuing one’s own existence, having a desire not to be harmed, and being able to experience harm. It is not sufficient to be the kind of being that will one day do these things. One must be able to do them now.

Underlying this is what philosophers call the mental continuity view. On this account, there is no “you” present until there is a stream of memory and experience—a biographical identity, not merely a biological one. The mere presence of a living human organism does not mean a person is present. The real “you,” they say, is your connected chain of thoughts, memories, and desires to go on living. Giubilini and Minerva embraced this so fully that when asked whether it would have been wrong to kill them before they developed these traits, they answered that no wrong would have occurred—because there was no “them” there yet.

Why the Argument Fails

The argument is clever, but it does not survive scrutiny.

Start with the claim that one must experience harm in order to be harmed. This is simply false to our ordinary moral intuitions. Suppose I am cheated out of an inheritance I am rightly owed, but I never learn of it. I experience no distress, yet I have plainly been wronged. Suppose someone slits my throat while I am under anesthesia, or shoots me from behind so that I die instantly, never feeling a thing. No suffering is experienced, yet a grave wrong has been done. If harm required the experience of harm, none of these would count as wrongs. They obviously are.

Consider next the claim that one must value one’s existence to be a person. Imagine a man who is deeply depressed and suicidal, who places no value on his life and wants only to die. Has he ceased to be himself? Has he lost his identity, his personhood? Of course not. He is as much a person as anyone, precisely the sort of person we should want to protect. Valuing one’s existence is not what makes one a self.

Worse for the argument, it proves far too much. This was pointed out not by a pro-lifer but by Bertha Alvarez, a philosopher who defends abortion yet objected to Giubilini and Minerva. Drawing on developmental psychology, she noted that two-year-olds—perhaps even three-year-olds—do not yet value their existence over time, lack a firm sense of themselves as continuing individuals, and may not clearly grasp that they exist separately from their parents. If personhood requires these capacities, then the argument reaches well past newborns and into toddlers and older children. It would follow that a healthy two-and-a-half-year-old who showed no apparent valuing of his own existence could be killed—and, on the logic that only actual persons hold a right to life, that his body could be used for organ farming or live medical experiments to benefit actual persons. The authors would seem not merely to permit this but to require it. That conclusion is monstrous, and it tells us the premises are false.

Boonin’s Different Road

Not every defender of abortion travels the mental-continuity route. In his 2002 book A Defense of Abortion, David Boonin takes a strikingly different path—and it is worth understanding, because it concedes what pro-lifers have long argued.

Boonin opens by placing two photographs side by side: an ultrasound image of his son Eli in the womb, and a photograph of Eli after birth. It is the same little boy, he admits. There is no difference in identity between them. You are indeed identical to the embryo you once were; that was not a blob of tissue but you. And then comes the thesis: even so, Boonin argues, it would have been morally permissible to have killed Eli at that earlier stage.

How can both be true? Boonin distinguishes identity from the right to life. You are the same being you were as an embryo, he says, but you did not then possess the same right to life you have now. We already assign some rights by developmental stage—a two-year-old has no right to vote or drive—so why not the right to life as well? What grounds that right, for Boonin, is having immediately exercisable desires, which he ties to organized cortical brain activity beginning around week twenty-eight. Before that, the human being exists and is identical to his later self, but lacks the right to life.

Here too the argument falters. We can question whether desires are an adequate foundation for the right to life at all. A slave can be conditioned not to desire his freedom, yet he remains entitled to it in virtue of the kind of being he is. Children may not desire good nutrition or education, but they are owed them all the same. Imagine a man who damages the very part of his brain responsible for desire in an accident—does he forfeit his right to life because he no longer desires anything? Borrowing an example from Frank Beckwith, imagine a physician who surgically alters a developing fetus so that it never forms desires; if that child is killed at age five for his organs, are we to say no wrong was done because he desired nothing? Or consider a person who, through discipline, reaches a state of desiring nothing at all. Has he stopped being a person with a right to life? Surely not.

The Common Thread

Giubilini, Minerva, and Boonin arrive at their conclusions by different roads—one grounded in identity, the other in rights—but the conclusions converge, and both are deadly. What unites them is the attempt to make human value contingent on traits that none of us share equally and that come and go across a lifetime: the capacity to value one’s existence, to hold desires, to experience harm. Tie human worth to accidental capacities, and human worth becomes negotiable.

The pro-life answer is not to deny that the fetus and the newborn are alike. It is to insist that they are alike in the way that matters most: both are living human beings, and human beings are valuable by nature, not by function. That is a claim these arguments cannot defeat—but it is one we must be equipped to defend.

Episode Transcript

This transcript was generated from the episode’s YouTube captions and lightly edited for readability: filler words and the mid-show announcements have been removed. It may still contain transcription errors.

Welcome friends. Delighted to have you with us on this episode of the Case for Life Show. Hey, we’re going to talk today about worldview. We’re going to talk today about afterbirth abortion and why we as Christians must be equipped to engage the worldview ideas that are driving culture right now. You know, there’s a lot of noise right now in some sectors of the pro-life movement where we’re being told if pro-lifers would just, you know, sign on to this or that political strategy or this or that leader that we could end abortion quickly.

Nothing could be further from the truth. We’re going to have to work prudently. And that means we’re going to have to know what the culture is thinking. And to that end, I want to remind you about something we have available here at the Case for Life Show. We have a course designed to equip you thoroughly to defend your pro-life views. It’ll teach you how to engage the toughest academic critics on the other side. We’ll talk about one of those today, and we’ll give you direction on how to understand the foundational worldviews the public brings to this debate.

It’s no accident we find ourselves in a real struggle today. I know you probably have had this happen to you. You’re talking to somebody and you think, “Man, what planet did they just step off of? It seems like we don’t agree on anything.” Well, you’re actually right. Their worldview foundations can be so drastically different from your own that you find yourself almost like you’re in a foreign country speaking a foreign language to even try to engage them. There are reasons for that and we want to help make you smart on what those reasons are.

So you can take a look at our sites. We have information on the course there. I’ll give you a heads up. It’s a tough sled. No pun intended. It’s tough going because it is graduate level material. Now don’t get afraid about that. When I say graduate level, what I mean is it’s indepth. It’s not just some surface level. Oh, here are five quick answers you can give to someone who’s pro-abortion. Quite frankly, that kind of training has very little value. It might help you score some points in a conversation, but it won’t go very far in persuading the person you’re talking to.

You need an indepth understanding of the issue. Quite frankly, you need to master the pro-life issue, and our course will help you do that. So, please see our sites for information on that. Okay. We’ve been doing a five-part series that will wrap up today on the major thinkers promoting abortion from the academic fields. We’ve looked at people like Michael Tulie, Kate Griezley, Peter Singer. And today we’re going to look at two people who promote what is known as afterbirth abortion. And primarily we’re talking here about Jubelini and Manurva.

You may have those names may ring a bell. You may have thought to yourself, “Wait a minute, I heard those names. Where did I hear of them?” Well, a little over a decade ago, they published a piece in a major academic journal arguing that abortion is only one half of the coin here. That really all of the arguments that are used to justify abortion work just as well to justify killing newborns. In other words, they were promoting infanicide. And it sent shock waves through the philosophic and ethics community.

And academics, even academics who support abortion, were horrified. But all they did is basically make the point that look, these same arguments you’re using to justify abortion work equally well to kill newborns. That birth is not a relevant dividing line. Now, that shouldn’t have been news to the academic community. I mean Peter Singer and Michael Tulie had been advancing arguments for decades basically saying that you know birth is nothing special being human is nothing special that the arguments that were being used at that time even way back when Singer and Tuli first came on the scene those arguments way back there that justified infanicide and abortion were a shock to some people but those arguments have been percolating in the culture for a long time.

The problem here was that Jubelina, Jubelini and Manurva wrote a piece that caught the eye of the press. And this made headlines all throughout society, even made the evening news in my hometown at the time. And what we had was the public, not just academics, but the public for the first time seeing someone say, “Wait a minute. If we can kill fetuses, why can’t we kill newborns? Neither are actual persons. And that leads us to what I want to begin with today.

It’s always good to start with worldview assumptions. What world views are people bringing to the abortion debate? And we’ve talked about this before, but I want to do just a brief revisit of that here before we jump into Jubilini and Manurva. Because I think it helps us to understand the foundation that people ground their arguments in. Now, if you think about what a worldview is, we’ve talked about this before. You can think of a world view as glasses through which you view reality.

And these glasses or lenses, whatever word you want to use, doesn’t matter to me. These glasses are what make sense of reality to you. You might think of them as clusters of foundational beliefs. And with those worldview glasses, you look at the world and make sense of it. Now, the big competitors are things like philosophical naturalism. That is the belief that the universe came from nothing and was caused by nothing. Everything you see around you is the result of undirected chance.

So things like human beings, animals, any living thing, they do not have any intrinsic purposes. Why? Because how they got here was purely accidental. And in that worldview, knowledge is strictly physical. If you can’t taste it, touch it, feel it, see it, or hear it. It’s not real. If it cannot be measured and tested empirically on philosophical naturalism, it’s not real. Well, where does that leave us with ethics? Well, with ethics then there’s no objective right and wrong because human beings have no intrinsic purposes they ought to fulfill.

I mean, stop and think about it. If human beings are cosmic accidents, they don’t have obligations that flow from their intrinsic purposes. They’re just accidental physical matter like everything else in the universe. You can’t get objective right and wrong in that kind of world. If you are going to have objective right and wrong, you need an objective moral lawgiver where you ground your moral rules. But philosophical naturalism can’t give us that. And so ethics gets reduced to well, what do we contract to agree on?

Or maybe what have I given consent to? That’s about as far as you can go. You go human beings don’t have souls. They don’t have any kind of immaterial nature or essence. And as a result, it basically is just up to us to construct ourselves however we want. And then you think about what this worldview means. When you think about cosmology, we came from nothing and we’re caused by nothing. Well, that means that history is going essentially wherever it goes. There’s no rhyme or reason to it.

And when it’s all over, we just die. That’s it. No judgment, no giving an account for your life, no measurement against a standard you should have lived up to. You just die like everything else in the universe. You cease to exist. Death is final. That’s it. Now, think about that worldview combined with this worldview that we also see today, the post-modern worldview. Now, the postmodern worldview says this. Even if objective reality and truth existed, we could never get at it because we’re trapped behind our own perceptions.

We only see reality through the lenses of our own cultural or individual biases. That’s it. We don’t have any objective standard out there we can make contact with. Maybe it does, maybe it doesn’t exist. On the post-modern worldview, it doesn’t matter. That objective standard is out of our view because we’re trapped behind our own filters, if you will, to use the modern vernacular. As a result, knowledge is simply what we talk about. We construct reality through our language. Basically, by talking about it, we make reality.

What’s ultimately real can’t be known because we are trapped behind our own biases. Now, where does that leave human beings? Well, on the naturalistic worldview, it leaves human beings as mere cosmic accidents. On the post-modern worldview, human beings are simply what we construct. I mean, think about the famous mystery passage in the Casey Supreme Court decision of 1992. And I’m going to summarize it here because it’s word for word recitation is slipping my mind at the moment. But here’s what it basically said.

It basically said that every human individual has a right to determine for themselves the meaning of the universe, the mystery of human life, and our place in the universe. In other words, we construct the meaning of what it means to be human. It’s not objective out there. We don’t discover it. We create it or if you will construct it from place to place according to our own cultural beliefs and lenses. That’s the reality of human nature. So there’s no objective human nature.

There’s just what we construct about humans. That’s the post-modern view. And you might be thinking, well, wait a minute, that’s problematic right out of the gate. Yeah, it is. Because if human nature doesn’t exist objectively, neither do the natural rights that spring from that human nature, things like the right to life, the right to pursue happiness, and the things we see listed in the Declaration of Independence, for example. If human nature is not real and knowable, the natural rights that preede government also aren’t real and knowable, and there’s really no foundation for affirming them.

Why do I bring all this up? Well, when people get outraged at people like, you know, Jubelini and Manurva or someone else who suggest to us that killing newborns is really no different than killing fetuses because neither is an actual person, it’s helpful to understand how someone could arrive at that case. Now, you would think someone that viewed human nature as being objective and real and knowable would say this. Well, you’re right that there’s no essential difference between fetus and newborn.

But the correct conu conclusion is not to say you can kill both. The correct conclusion is to say we ought to value both that both are valuable by nature and we should see it that way. But on a post-modern worldview where we construct reality or on a philosophical naturalistic worldview where it’s all accidental and there’s no intrinsic purposes to anything, why not arrive at a conclusion that nothing that’s living has intrinsic value? Why not kill both fetus and newborn if that fits your logical paradigm?

So what Jubelini and Manurva are going to argue is essentially something that Peter Singer had argued before and to some degree I would say that Michael Tulie and Peter Singer did as well. The structure of their argument goes like this. Fetus newborn doesn’t matter. Neither is a person with a right to life. And the same arguments used to justify abortion justify killing newborns. In other words, the practice of infanticide. If you want to get to the nitty-gritty of the structure of their argument, it goes like this.

Premise one, neither fetus or newborn, is an actual person. Rather, each is simply a potential person. Premise two, only actual persons, not potential ones, have a right to life. Premise three, to be a person with a right to life, you have to be someone who values your existence. And since fetuses and newborns don’t, obviously they don’t count. Premise four, fetus and newborns do not value their existence. Thus, they are potential persons, not actual ones. The fifth premise, the interests of actual persons always outweighs that of potential ones.

And so there you go. Fetus and newborn need not apply. The conclusion is therefore abortion and infanticide are both morally permissible because they don’t involve killing actual persons. They involve only killing potential ones and only actual ones have a right to life. Now notice some common things here we’ve seen with Peter Singer and with Michael Tulie. For example, being human is not enough. That’s not really sufficient to ground a right to life for you. So what would be what Jubilini and Manurva and Singer and Tuli would say being a member of the human species having human DNA as they might put it is not sufficient to ground your right to life and make you an actual person.

So their definition of personhood notice three things they talk about. You’ve got to be capable of valuing your existence. And by that they don’t mean that by nature you’re the kind of thing that will eventually value your existence. They mean you must be able to immediately exercise a desire to go on living, value your existence, that kind of thing. You must also have a desire not to be harmed. And you must be capable of immediately experiencing harm. So keep those three things in mind.

Capable of valuing your existence, capable of having a desire not to be harmed, and capable of having the experience of harm. And you’ve got to be able to immediately exercise those characteristics. They’re not it’s not good enough that you are the type of being that will be able to do that unlike an amoeba or maybe a rock, for example. All right. Now we’ve talked here about the mental continuity theory and Jubelini and Manurva also hold to that view. The mental continuity view is the idea that there’s no you there until you have memory connected cognitively to previous memories.

That what really matters is not your biological identity but your biographical identity. The mere fact there’s a human organism present does not mean there’s identity present. And this is an important thing to keep in mind because when we talk the next time about David Boon, we’re going to have to remember this mental continuity view because Boon’s going to take us a different direction altogether. But what Jubilini Manurva singer Tulie and others who hold to the me mental continuity view are asserting is that the real you is connected to your thoughts, your memories, the string of experiences you’ve had in the past and in the future to your desire to go on living and not be harmed.

Okay, that’s the mental continuity view. So on their view, in order to be harmed, you’ve got to be able to experience harm. Now, right away, that should cause us to kind of scratch our heads. Couldn’t I be harmed even if I don’t know that I’ve been harmed? For example, think about this. If you cheat me out of a an inheritance that I should be getting, I justly should receive that inheritance, but you cheat me out of it, but I never know of it.

You might say, “Okay, I didn’t experience the harm of being cheat cheated out of that inheritance, but was I still wronged?” Obviously. Or if you slip my throat while I’m sleeping or under anesthesia, I may not feel harm, but was I harmed? And I think the answer, of course, yes, I was. So, this idea that you must be capable of recognizing or experiencing harm in order to be harmed, to be a person. In other words, on their view, I think it can be questioned.

We can push back on that and with good reason. Now, what about this idea that you must value your existence in order to be a person, to have an identity? Suppose I’m a an individual very sad, depressed, and maybe even suicidal. I no longer see any value to my life. In fact, I just want to die. I want to crawl into one of those suicide pods they have over there in the Netherlands. And in Belgium and I just want to be done with it.

I do not value my existence at all. Do I still have an identity? Am I still me? I would say yeah, of course. So, I don’t understand how this gets tied to personhood and to identity. And I think too we can point out that when it comes to harm, what if I were killed immediately? Instant annihilation. Somebody comes up behind me, shoots me in the back of the head. I never feel it. I don’t experience any momentary suffering. I just die immediately.

I’ve still been wronged, have I not? So again, I’m not persuaded by this definition at all. This idea that you must experience harm in order to be harmed, I don’t think is persuasive at all. I also think the argument proves way more than maybe even they want it to prove. Here’s what we’re learning in the latest psychological research. And it’s interesting who pointed this out. Bertha Alvarez, who is a pro-abortion philosopher who argues in favor of abortion, but took issue with Jubilini and Manurva, points out in her piece in response to their article that two-year-olds, perhaps even three-year-olds now we know don’t value their existence over time, don’t have a sense of individualistic identity as their lives being something they want to continue over time.

And they may not have a clear concept of existing separate from their parents. That those things really may not kick in until age three, the latest research is saying, which means this argument that they’re putting forward would do way more than just justify killing newborns and fetuses. It moves us into the example of harming toddlers and older children. This is very disturbing and as a result I think we’re within our rights to reject this view but you need to be aware of it.

Remember their primary claim is there’s no you present until you can experience the things they mention. In fact, they respond to an objection in the course of an interview they did where they were asked what if they had been killed before they had these traits. And it was interesting and curious to see their answer. They said, ‘Well, we would not have been harmed because there was no we there back then. Yeah, there was a physical body that is genetically human, but there’s no identity.

There’s no you there at that point. So again, they’re making an identity argument here. And keep in mind on their view, only actual persons have a right to life, not mere potential ones. Now, you might also ask, well, where does this lead us? Wouldn’t this also justify killing a healthy toddler that was not yet fully in grip of their own identity over time and valuing their existence? What if we had a 2 and 1/2year-old who showed no apparent valuing of his own existence?

What would be wrong on their view of killing this kid for the purpose of using his body parts to treat illness and others? I mean, if only actual persons have a right to life and not merely potential ones, why not use this child for organ farming? Why not use him for live medical experiments to benefit others? In fact, I’m really thinking on their view, you would be obliged to because it’s only actual persons who have a right to life. Potential ones don’t have any claim and therefore they should be used to serve the needs of actual persons.

There’s a lot of stuff that flows from these arguments where people try to make human value contingent on traits that none of us share equally and that come and go throughout the course of our lifetimes. We’ve talked about these in previous shows. You can look those up and we also talk about them in the course. And again, I want to remind you, take a look at that course. You must equip yourself to engage. All right, we’re going to take a break.

When we come back, we’re going to talk about a thinker who goes a little different direction than Jubelini and Manurva. We’ll get to that after the other side.

Welcome back everybody. As we said before, we have a course available that will equip you to answer these academic arguments we’ve been looking at for the last several shows. And it’s vital that we know how to engage our sharpest critics on the other side. Okay, that leads to a final figure we want to look at, David Boon. David Bunan is going to depart from the mental continuity theory of Peter Singer, Michael Tulie, Jubilini Manurva, and others. And David Bunan is going to advance a shocking thesis.

He’s going to look at pro-lifers and say, “You are right. You are indeed identical to the embryo you once were. That wasn’t a blob of tissue back then. That was you.” He’s going to admit that even his own son Eli is the same kid after birth as before. And he’s got a stunning introduction in his book, A Defense of Abortion, where he makes this point very clear. He contrasts photos of his son Eli in the womb from an ultrasound imagery and his child after Eli was born.

And he says, “Look, it’s the same exact little boy. There’s no difference between these two in terms of identity. However, says Boon, the thesis I will advance in this book is that it would have been morally permissible for me to have killed Eli at that earlier stage of development. Why? Because on Boon’s view, although you’re identical to the embryo you once were, you don’t have the same right to life then as you do now. For example, when you were a 2-year-old, he says, you didn’t have a right to vote or drive.

So, it’s not uncommon for us to sign to assign rights based on one’s development and one’s growth and maturity. Therefore, why not do the same with the right to life? So, again, notice the departure here. Boon’s going to say, guess what? That was you back then. You are the same being. However, just because you’re identical to your former fetal self doesn’t mean you have the same right to life then as you do now. What grounds a right to life for David Boon?

And he puts this forward in his book, A Defense of Abortion, which was published in 2002. He argues that what grounds your right to life is having immediately exercisable desires. So until you have these immediately exercisable desires, which he said aren’t present until there’s organized cortical brain function, which he puts it somewhere around week 28 in the womb, you don’t have a right to life. You certainly are a human being. You’re identical to yourself, but you don’t have the same right to life then as you do now as an adult.

All right. Well, a few quick thoughts on this because we don’t have a lot of time left in this show. First, we can question whether having desires is an adequate foundation for grounding a right to life. A slave can be conditioned not to desire his freedom, but I think we would all argue he’s entitled to it in virtue of the kind of thing he is. And if he is a human being, even if he doesn’t desire such a right, he’s entitled to it.

We’ve pointed out before that children may not desire good nutrition or a good education, but they’re still entitled to them in virtue of the kind of thing they are. You could also think of somebody who might have an accident. Say I’m working with a staple gun and I accidentally shoot myself in the head with it instead of nailing that 2×4 stud the way I needed to. Suppose it damages my brain and damages the part of the brain where I have desires.

Does that mean I lose my right to life because I no longer desire anything due to that injury? Or you might in envision a case to borrow an example from my friend Frank Beckwith where a doctor surgically alters the brain of a developing fetus so it never develops desires at all. Now assume that child at age five is killed so his bodily organs can be used to treat disease and others. And the argument would be well he didn’t desire to go on living because he had his brain altered so no wrong was done.

I think we can see how horrific this would be. I think too you could think of somebody who achieves nirvana. They become so stoic in their view that they don’t desire anything. Do they cease to be persons with a right to life? These are some challenging things that go with Boon’s thinking. Again, it’s vital you as a proifer know how to engage these people. I hope you’ll take a look at our course. Until next time, I look forward to seeing you then.