Article adapted from episode content.

In an era defined by readily accessible information, equipping individuals—particularly students—with a robust, biblical Christian worldview is paramount. It is a mistake to assume that simply because children attend church, youth groups, or Christian schools, they have inherently absorbed this worldview. Instances often arise where school administrators praise students for being “good”—meaning engaged, well-behaved, and respectful of authority—yet clarifying questions reveal that only a small percentage (perhaps 10 to 12 percent) actually adhere to core teachings, such as those concerning the sanctity of human life. Being merely “nice” is insufficient; students require specific tools and qualified instruction to engage with and defend their beliefs. Organizations featuring faculty like Shawn McDow, John Ston Street of the Coulson Center, Dr. Jeff Meyers, Brett Conungl at Maven, and Alan Schlean at Stand Reason work to equip students in this manner.

A critical area where equipped thinking is essential involves the scientific basis for the pro-life view. Objections frequently arise claiming that “Science doesn’t tell us anything about whether the unborn are human”. However, such objections typically rely on predictable fallacies that confuse developmental stage with the fundamental kind of being.

Confusing Stage with Kind

A common challenge employs the analogy of an acorn: “An acorn is not an oak tree. Therefore, a fetus is not a human being”. While it is undeniable that an acorn is not yet a mature oak tree, just as a newborn is not a teenager or an adult, this comparison misses a crucial distinction. These examples merely represent different stages of the same kind of being. An acorn, though not an oak tree, is definitively an oak from its beginning. Likewise, while an embryo or fetus is not yet a baby, teenager, or adult, it is, from the outset, a human being. This fact is thoroughly substantiated by embryology research.

A related objection suggests that development involves a change in kind, using the example that “a caterpillar is not a butterfly,” implying “an evolution” where the entity fundamentally changes. This, too, is incorrect. The caterpillar and the butterfly belong to the same species, the same kind of being, despite undergoing significant changes in outward form as they grow. Similarly, an early embryo may briefly resemble a fish a few days after conception, but the fundamental kind of entity—the human being—remains constant through all subsequent developmental forms, progressing from embryo to fetus to baby, teenager, and adult. It is a flawed argument to assume that because something changes its appearance, it was once a different kind of entity.

Judging the humanity of an entity based on its appearance is profoundly dangerous. Historically, the argument that one group of people “doesn’t look like us” has been used to deny rights and humanity. For instance, 160 years ago, many people argued that black men were not human because they did not look like white men. Tragically, this prejudice extended into the 20th century; as late as 1906 at the Bronx Zoological Garden, followers of Charles Darwin, immersed in naturalistic thinking, placed an African pygmy man named Otabanga in a cage with an orangutan, labeling the exhibit “the missing link”. Otabanga was so haunted by this labeling that he later committed suicide, having been distressed by being labeled a “mere animal” simply because of how he looked. Appearance can be deceptive, as seen when people confuse realistic mannequins for real individuals, or when hostile individuals in the black and white movie judged the Elephant Man solely by his appearance, prompting his anguished cry, “I am a man”. We must look deeper than “mere surface appearance” when considering the embryo, which may not look like us, but is nonetheless “one of us”.

The Five Predictable Scientific Objections

Those who seek to dismiss the pro-life scientific claim often raise a handful of objections which are “so predictable” they can be anticipated and checked off in advance.

1. The Twinning Objection

The first common challenge is twinning, arguing that because an early embryo can split into two up to 21 days after fertilization, one cannot claim that the combination of sperm and egg results in a “living human being” initially. While the fact that twinning can occur is undisputed, the conclusion drawn from this fact is logically unsound. The question is: how does the ability of a living entity to split negate the fact that it was a whole living entity before the split occurred?. Analogously, slicing a flatworm in half results in two flatworms; yet, it does not follow that there was no flatworm before the split. Twinning, though rare, simply means the original entity splits.

2. Molar Pregnancies

A second, similar objection concerns molar pregnancies, where sperm and egg unite, but the process of fertilization is incomplete, failing to produce a distinct, living human embryo. Instead, the result is genetic material, often resembling a tumor, which may contain fragments of bone, hair, or teeth, but is not a complete human organism. Critics use this to argue that not every instance of sperm and egg combination yields a living human being.

However, the pro-life argument is not that every combination results in a living human being; rather, the argument is that every living person began when sperm and egg united. The critical error in the objection is asserting that the molar pregnancy morphs from an embryo into a tumor. Dr. Maren Condic, a geneticist and neurologist, illustrates this distinction: embryos start off as embryos and remain so, just as molar pregnancies start off as molar pregnancies and remain so. They are fundamentally different from the beginning. Like the common melody shared by “Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star” and “The Alphabet Song,” or “My Country ’Tis of Thee” and “God Save the King/Queen,” these biological entities may appear superficially similar in the earliest stages, but they are clearly different from their inception. An embryo remains a human being until delivery or intentional killing, whereas a molar pregnancy starts and remains an incomplete fertilization process until miscarried.

3. Miscarriage Rate and the Is/Ought Fallacy

The third objection points to the high rate of miscarriage, often occurring before a woman even realizes she is pregnant, suggesting that “even nature doesn’t acknowledge the humanity of these children”. This argument implies that if nature spontaneously triggers the loss of developing humans, then intentional, elective abortion is justified. This constitutes a “complete non sequitur”.

It is a philosophical error known as the is/ought fallacy: assuming that because something is the case in nature, we ought to be able to do it intentionally or normatively. Natural disasters like earthquakes, typhoons, or hurricanes spontaneously kill thousands of people; yet, no one suggests that because nature kills spontaneously, mass murder is justified for us to do intentionally. Nature’s actions do not grant moral permission for intentional killing.

4. The Feeling/Grief Objection

The fourth objection related to miscarriage suggests that women often do not grieve the loss of an early miscarriage with the same intensity as the death of an older child (a newborn, toddler, or teenager). While acknowledging that some couples grieve miscarriages or infertility deeply, the core philosophical problem remains: how does one’s feeling about something change its ontological status—what it is?.

The feelings of an individual toward a victim have no bearing on the victim’s humanity. For example, a serial killer who feels nothing for his victims, or parents who severely abuse and neglect their children, do not diminish the victim’s status as a human being. The indifference or lack of feeling represents a “flaw in the parent” or the observer, not a reflection of the victim’s ontological status. To argue that the lack of grief following a miscarriage implies the non-humanity of the embryo is a “fallacious way to argue”.

5. Dismissal by Changing Categories

The fifth predictable challenge is not based on science at all, but attempts to dismiss the pro-life position by shifting categories. The challenger argues, “Religion can’t tell us when life begins”. While it is true that religion does not answer the empirical question of when an individual living thing comes to be, the objection’s intent is to dismiss the pro-life view as merely “subjective, religious” belief rather than “real knowledge”.

The issue of when an individual life begins is an empirical question investigated using the tools of the science of embryology. Arguments are either sound or unsound, valid or invalid; they cannot be refuted merely by calling them a name, such as “religious”.

The core pro-life argument is structured logically:

• Premise One: It is wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being.
• Premise Two: Abortion intentionally kills an innocent human being.
• Conclusion: Therefore, abortion is wrong.

If an opponent wishes to refute this, they must either show the conclusion does not logically follow or demonstrate that one or more premises are factually false. By changing the subject from the empirical science of embryology to religion, opponents attempt a dismissal rather than a refutation, claiming the argument is a “religious article of faith,” meaning belief in spite of evidence, rather than trust based on evidence.

While scripture is crucial in determining why humans are valuable (bearing the image of God), the type of thing a living entity is and when it begins to exist is determined by turning to the empirical source: the science of embryology. This science clearly establishes that the unborn, from the earliest stages of development, are distinct, living, and whole human beings.

Confusing Parts with Wholes

A final, related scientific objection attempts to equate the living cells of an embryo with the somatic cells found elsewhere on the body, such as cells pinched from the back of the hand. The argument is that since both are merely living cells, and no one is worried about skin cells suffering demise, the embryo’s demise should not be a concern either, especially since embryos are “too small,” lack complex thought, and do not feel anything.

This objection fundamentally confuses parts with wholes. The cells on the back of the hand are merely parts of a larger human being. They are not distinct, whole living beings, unlike the embryo.

The distinction is tested by considering what happens to these cells if moved. A somatic (skin) cell, if placed in the fallopian tube of a prospective mother, will do “absolutely nothing”; it will not develop into an embryo, fetus, or adult. Conversely, an embryo, if sustained in the mother’s body with proper nutrition, will intrinsically, internally, and autonomously progress through all subsequent stages of development. The embryo is “driving its own internal development”. A corpse contains many living cells, but is not alive because those cells are no longer communicating and coordinating to promote the health of the larger organism. The embryo, from its beginning, functions as a “coordinated whole” driving its own development.